China outlines plans for nonproliferation ( 2003-12-04 00:54) (China Daily)
China revealed in detail Wednesday the methods of preventing dangerous
weapons from falling into the wrong hands, outlining its approach to
nonproliferation.
A "White Paper on China's Non- Proliferation Policy and Measures'' was
published by the Information Office of the State Council in Beijing Wednesday.
The 9,000-Chinese word White Paper, the first of its kind, reiterates China's
firm stance against the proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and elaborates on the country's
persistent non-proliferation efforts.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction benefit no one —
particularly China itself, said the White Paper.
"A developing China needs both an international and a peripheral environment
of long-term peace and stability," the White Paper said. "The proliferation of
WMD and their means of delivery benefits neither world peace and stability nor
China's own security."
It said China had made sure an array of procedures and penalties
was in place to prevent companies from transferring technology or materials that
could be made into chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. "No license, no
exports."
A detailed government agencies responsible for monitoring technology
exports that could be used for weapons were published in the White Paper.
"Over the years, with its strong sense of responsibility, China has step
by step formulated a whole set of non-proliferation policies and put in place a
fairly complete legal framework on non- proliferation and export control,'' says
the White Paper, adding that the country has taken positive and constructive
measures to accelerate the international non-proliferation process with concrete
actions.
"China will join the members of the international community who love peace
and stability in making contributions to accelerating the development and
improvement of the international non-proliferation mechanism and to promoting
world peace, stability and development through unremitting international efforts
and co-operation,'' it pledges.
It stresses that China would persist in settling the issue of proliferation
of WMD and their means of delivery through peaceful means.
The White Paper has seven parts, namely Foreword, China's Basic Stand on
Non-Proliferation, Actively Participating in International Non-Proliferation
Efforts, Non-Proliferation Export Control System, Concrete Measures for
Non-Proliferation Export Control, Strictly Implementing the Laws and Regulations
on Non-Proliferation Export Control, and Conclusion.
To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
means of delivery is conducive to the preservation of international and regional
peace and security, and compatible with the common interests of the
international community. This hasbecome a consensus of the international
community. Through protracted and unremitting efforts, the international
community has established a relatively complete international non-proliferation
regime, which has played a positive role in preventing and slowing down the
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and in safeguarding peace and
security both regional and global.
Economic globalization and the rapid advancement of science andtechnology
have provided the international community good opportunities for cooperation and
development, and also many new challenges. At present, traditional and
non-traditional security factors are inter-woven, with the latter being steadily
on the rise. Countries are linked more closely to each other in security
matters, and their interdependence is continually deepening. It isan inevitable
demand of the times to strengthen international cooperation and seek common
security for all countries. The non-proliferation efforts of all countries and
the development of the international non-proliferation mechanism are mutually
complementary and inseparably linked with each other. Given the new
international security situation, it is particularly importantand urgent to step
up international cooperation in the field of non-proliferation, and develop and
improve the international non-proliferation mechanism.
The purpose of China's foreign policy is to help safeguard world peace and
promote common development. A developing China needs both an international and a
peripheral environment of long-term peace and stability. The proliferation of
WMD and their meansof delivery benefits neither world peace and stability nor
China'sown security. Over the years, with its strong sense of responsibility,
China has step by step formulated a whole set of non-proliferation policies and
put in place a fairly complete legal framework on non-proliferation and export
control. It has taken positive and constructive measures to accelerate the
international non-proliferation process with concrete actions, thus making
significant contributions to safeguarding and promoting international and
regional peace and security.
I. China's Basic Stand on
Non-Proliferation
China has always taken a responsible attitude toward international affairs,
stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of WMD,
including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and resolutely opposed the
proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery. China does not
support, encourage or assist any country to develop WMD and their means of
delivery.
China holds that the fundamental purpose of non-proliferation is to safeguard
and promote international and regional peace and security, and all measures to
this end should be conducive to attaining this goal. The proliferation of WMD
and their means of delivery has its complicated causes; it has everything to do
with the international and regional security environment. To pursue theuniversal
improvement of international relations, to promote the democratization of such
relations and to accelerate fair and rational settlement of the security issues
of regions concerned will help international non-proliferation efforts to
proceed in a smooth manner. China resolutely supports international
non-proliferation efforts, and at the same time cares very much for peace and
stability in the region and the world at large. China stands for the attainment
of the non-proliferation goal through peaceful means, i.e. on the one hand, the
international non-proliferation mechanism must be continually improved and
export controls of individual countries must be updated and strengthened,and on
the other hand, proliferation issues must be settled through dialogue and
international cooperation.
China maintains that a universal participation of the international community
is essential for progress in non-proliferation. To gain an understanding and
support of the overwhelming majority of the international community, it is
highlyimportant to ensure a fair, rational and non-discriminatory
non-proliferation regime. Either the improvement of the existing regime or the
establishment of a new one should be based on the universal participation of all
countries and on their decisions made through a democratic process.
Unilateralism and double standards must be abandoned, and great importance
should be attached and full play given to the role of the United Nations.
China believes that given the dual-use nature of many of the materials,
equipment and technologies involved in nuclear, biological, chemical and
aerospace fields, it is important that all countries, in the course of
implementing their non-proliferation policies, strike a proper balance between
non-proliferation and international cooperation for peaceful use of the relevant
high technologies. In this connection, China maintains that, while it is
necessary to guarantee the rights of all countries, especially the developing
nations, to utilize and share dual-use scientific and technological achievements
and products for peaceful purposes subject to full compliance with
thenon-proliferation goal, it is also necessary to prevent any country from
engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful utilization.
II. Actively Participating in
International Non-Proliferation Efforts
Over the years, China has participated extensively in the construction of the
multilateral non-proliferation mechanism and actively promoted its constant
improvement and development. China has signed all international treaties related
to non-proliferation,and joined most of the relevant international
organizations.
In the nuclear field, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in 1984, and voluntarily placed its civilian nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards. It acceded to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) in 1992. It tookan active part in the negotiations of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva and made important contributions to the conclusion of the treaty. China
was also among the first countries to sign CTBT in 1996. China became a member
of the Zangger Committee in 1997. China signed the Protocol Additional to the
Agreement Between China and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China in
1998, and in early 2002 formally completed the domestic legal procedures
necessary for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, thus becoming the
first nuclear-weapon state to complete the relevant procedures. China actively
participated in the work of the IAEA, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO
and other related international organizations. It supported the IAEA's
contribution to the prevention of potential nuclear terrorist activities, and
took an active and constructive part in the revision of the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.
China has energetically backed up countries concerned in their efforts to
establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. It has signed and ratified the protocols to
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty ofRarotonga), and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of
Pelindaba). China has expressly committed itself to signing the protocol to the
Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and supported
the initiative for the establishment of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free
zone.
In the biological field, China has always strictly observed itsobligations
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (BWC) sinceits accession in 1984. As from 1988, it has, on an annual
basis, submitted to the United Nations the declaration data of the
confidence-building measures for the BWC in accordance with the decision of its
Review Conference. China has also enthusiasticallycontributed to the
international efforts aimed at enhancing the BWC effectiveness, and actively
participated in the negotiations on the protocol to the BWC and in international
affairs related tothe BWC.
In the chemical field, China has made a positive contribution to the
negotiation and conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use ofChemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction (CWC). It signed the Convention in 1993 and deposited its instrument
of ratification in1997. Since the CWC came into force, China has stood firmly by
theOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in carrying out
its work, and earnestly fulfilled its obligations under the CWC. China has set
up the National Authority for the performance of its obligations envisaged in
the CWC, and submittedinitial and annual declarations of all kinds on schedule
and in their entirety. By the end of October 2003, China had received 68 on-site
verifications by the OPCW.
In the missile field, China supports the international community in its
efforts to prevent the proliferation of missiles and related technologies and
materials, and adopts a positive and open attitude toward all international
proposals for strengtheningthe missile non-proliferation mechanism. China has
constructively participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts
on Missiles, as well as the international discussions on the draftof the
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the
proposal of a Global Control System.
III. Non-Proliferation Export
Control System
Effective control of materials, equipment and technologies thatcould be used
in the development and production of WMD and their means of delivery is an
important aspect in a country's implementation of its international
non-proliferation obligation, and an important guarantee for the success of the
international non-proliferation efforts. As a country with some sci-tech and
industrial capabilities, China is well aware of its non-proliferation
responsibility in this field. For a long time, the Chinese government has
adopted rigorous measures both for the domestic control of sensitive items and
technologies and for theirexport control, and has kept making improvements in
light of the changing situation.
For a fairly long time in the past, China practiced a planned economy,
whereby the state relied mainly on administrative measures for import and export
control. This proved to be effective for implementing the non-proliferation
policy under the then prevailing historical conditions. But with the deepening
of China's reform and opening-up, and especially following the country's entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the environment of China's domestic
economy and foreign trade has undergone a tremendous change. So far, China has
initially established a socialist market economy, and its non-proliferation
export control pattern has shifted from an administrative control to a law-based
control.
In recent years, the Chinese government has constantly strengthened the work
of building a legal system to bolster non-proliferation on the principle of rule
of law to ensure the effective enforcement of its non-proliferation policy.
China has attached great importance to studies on the current international
standards of non-proliferation export control. Integrating the multinational
export control mechanism and the valuable experienceof other countries with its
own national conditions, China has widely adopted the current international
standards and practices, vigorously strengthened and improved the system for
ensuring non-proliferation export control, and formulated and enacted a number
of laws and regulations, which form a complete system for the export control of
nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and othersensitive items and
technologies, and all military products, and provide a full legal basis and
mechanism guarantee for the better attainment of the non-proliferation goal.
This export control regime has embraced the following practices:
Export Registration System: All exporters of sensitive items ortechnologies
must be registered with the competent departments of the Central Government.
Without the registration, no entity or individual is permitted to engage in such
exports. Only designatedentities are authorized to handle nuclear exports and
the export of controlled chemicals and military products. No other entity or
individual is permitted to go in for trade activities in this respect.
Licensing System: It is stipulated that the export of sensitiveitems and
technologies shall be subject to examination and approval by the competent
departments of the Central Government ona case-by-case basis. No license, no
exports. The holder of an export license must engage in export activities
strictly as prescribed by the license within its period of validity. If any
export item or contents are changed, the original license must be returned and
an application made for a new export license. When exporting the above-mentioned
items and technologies, an exporter shall produce the export license to the
Customs, go through the Customs formalities as stipulated by the Customs Law of
the People's Republic of China and the relevant control regulations and control
measures, and be subject to supervision and control by the Customs.
End-User and End-Use Certification: An exporter of sensitive items and
technologies is required to provide a certificate specifying the end-user and
the end-use, produced by the end-user that imports them. Different kinds of
certificates must be produced, depending on the circumstances and particularly
the sensitivity of the exported items or technologies. In some cases, the
certificates must be produced by the end-user and authenticated by the official
organ of the end-user's country and the Chinese embassy or consulate in that
country, while in others,they must be produced by the relevant government
department of theimporting country. The end-user must clarify the end-user and
end-use of the imported materials or technologies in the above-mentioned
certificates, and definitely guarantee that without permission from the Chinese
government, it shall not use the relevant item provided by China for purposes
other than the certified end-use, or transfer it to a third party other than the
certified end-user.
List Control Method: China has drawn up detailed control lists of sensitive
materials, equipment and technologies. In the nuclear,biological and chemical
fields, the relevant lists cover virtuallyall of the materials and technologies
included in the control lists of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Australian Group. In the
missile field, the scope of the Chinese list is generally the same as the
Technical Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In the arms
export field, the Chinese government also drew on the experience of the relevant
multilateral mechanismand the relevant practice of other countries when it first
formulated and issued the arms export control list in 2002. The Chinese
government will make timely adjustments to the above listsin light of actual
conditions.
Principle of Non-Proliferation-Oriented Examination and Approval: Before
making a decision on whether to issue an export license, the competent
department will give overall consideration to the possible effect of the
relevant exports on national security and the interests of general public, as
well as its effect on international and regional peace and stability. The
specific factors for reference in the examination and approval process include
China's incumbent international obligations and international commitments,
whether the export of the sensitive items or technologies will directly or
indirectly jeopardize China's national security or public interests, or
constitute a potential threat, and whether it conforms to the international
non-proliferation situation and China's foreign policy. An assessment of the
degree of proliferation risk of exporting a sensitive item or technology shall
be made by an independent panel of technical experts organized by the
examination and approval department.
The assessment will serve as an important reference in the examination and
approval process. The examination and approval department shall also make an
overall examination of the situationof the country or the region where the
end-user is located. It shall give special consideration to whether there is any
risk of proliferation in the country where the end-user is located or any risk
of proliferation to a third country or region, including: whether the importing
country will present a potential threat to China's national security; whether it
has a program for the development of WMD and their means of delivery; whether it
has close trade ties with a country or region having a program for
thedevelopment of WMD and their means of delivery; whether it is subject to
sanctions under a UN Security Council resolution; and whether it supports
terrorism or has any links with terrorist organizations. Moreover, the
examination and approval department shall also pay attention to the ability of
the importing country in exercising export control and whether its domestic
political situation and surrounding environment are stable. The focus of
examination of the end-user and end-use is to judge the ability ofthe importing
country to use the imported items or technologies, and to assess whether the
importer and the end-user are authentic and reliable, and whether the end-use is
justified.
"Catch-all" Principle: If an exporter knows or should know thatthere is a
risk of proliferation of an item or technology to be exported, the exporter is
required to apply for an export license even if the item or technology does not
figure in the export control list. When considering an export application or
deciding on whether to issue an export license, the export examination and
approval departments shall make an overall assessment of the end-use and
end-user of the item or technology to be exported and the risk of proliferation
of WMD. Once such a risk is identified, the competent departments have the right
to immediately refuse the requested export license, and terminate the export
activity. Moreover, the competent departments may also exercise, on an ad hoc
basis, export control on specific items not contained on the relevant control
list.
Penalties: Exporters who export controlled items or technologies without
approval, arbitrarily export items beyond theapproved scope, or forge, alter,
buy or sell export licenses shallbe investigated for criminal liability in
accordance with provisions in the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) on smuggling, illegal business operation, disclosure of statesecrets or
other crimes. For cases that do not constitute crimes, the competent government
department shall impose administrative sanctions, including warning,
confiscation of illicit proceeds, fines, suspension or even revocation of
foreign trade licenses.
IV. Concrete Measures for
Non-Proliferation Export Control
In the nuclear field, China has persisted in exercising stringent control
over nuclear exports and nuclear materials. In nuclear materials control, since
its accession to the IAEA, China has established a "State System for the
Accountancy and Control ofNuclear Materials," and a "Nuclear Materials Security
System" thatmeasures up to the requirements of the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Materials. In 1987, the Chinese government issued the
Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials. Under the regulations it
instituted a licensing system for nuclear materials. It designated the
department for supervision and control over nuclear materials and defined its
duties, the measures for nuclear materials control, the application for, and
examination and issuance of, nuclear materials licenses, the management of
nuclear materials accounts, the accountancy of nuclear materials, the physical
protection of nuclear materials, and relevant rewards and punishments.
China's nuclear export is handled exclusively by the companies designated by
the State Council. China adheres to the following three principles: guarantee
for peaceful use only, acceptance of the safeguards of the IAEA, and no
retransfer to a third country without the prior consent of the Chinese
government. The Chinese government issued the Regulations of the PRC on the
Control of Nuclear Export in 1997. Apart from the above-mentioned three
principles, the regulations also expound on China's policy of not advocating,
not encouraging and not engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not
helping other countries develop nuclear weapons, not providing any assistance to
any nuclear facility not placed under IAEA safeguards, not providing nuclear
exports to it,and not conducting personnel and technological exchange or
cooperation with it. The regulations also provide for a rigorous examination
system for nuclear export, severe violation punishments and a comprehensive and
detailed control list.
In 1998, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations of the PRC on the
Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export. Therein it
reaffirms its determination of strictly performing its international nuclear
non-proliferation obligations and exercising strict control over the export of
nuclear dual-use items and related technologies, and it instituted a licensing
system for related exports. It established a registration system for exporters
and the procedures for the examination and approval of exports, and defined
punishments for violations of the regulations. The Amendments to the Criminal
Law of the PRC adopted in December 2001 designate as criminal offenses such acts
as illegally manufacturing, trafficking and transporting radioactive substances,
and stipulate corresponding punishments for such offenses.
In the biological field, China has promulgated and implemented a series of
laws, rules and regulations in the past two decades and more, including the
Criminal Law of the PRC in 1979, the Tentative Measures on the Stockpiling and
Management of Veterinarian Bacteria Culture in 1980, the Regulations on the
Management of Veterinary Medicines in 1987, the Law of the PRC on the Prevention
and Control of Infectious Diseases in 1989, the Lawon the Quarantine of Animals
and Plants Brought into or Taken Out of the Chinese Territory in 1991, the
Measures for the Control of Biological Products for Animal Uses and the
Procedures for the Safe Administration of Agricultural Biological Gene
Engineering in1996, and the Standards for the Quality of the Biological
Productsfor Animal Uses in 2001. These laws, rules and regulations have made
strict provisions on the production, control, use, stockpiling, carriage and
transfer of relevant bacteria (viruses),vaccines and biological products. The
Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC adopted in December 2001 designate as
criminal offenses such acts as illegally manufacturing, trafficking,
transporting, stockpiling or using infectious pathogens, and stipulate
corresponding punishments for such offenses.
In October 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations of the
PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment
and Technologies, and the control list. It instituted a licensing system for the
export of dual-use biological agents and related equipment and technologies and
a registration system for the exporters, and established the principle that the
relevant exports shall not be used for biological weapon purposes, that without
prior consent of the Chinese government, the dual-use biological agents and
related equipment and technologies supplied by China shall not be used
forpurposes other than the declared end-use, or be retransferred to athird party
other than the declared end-user. Besides, the regulations also provide strict
procedures for export examination and approval and punishments for violations of
the regulations.
In the chemical field, the Chinese government promulgated between 1995 and
1997 the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of the Controlled
Chemicals, the Controlled Chemicals List and the Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of the Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of the
ControlledChemicals, designating the department in charge of the supervisionof
the controlled chemicals and defining its duties, making a detailed
classification of the controlled chemicals and exercisingstrict control over the
production, sale, use, import and export of sensitive chemicals. Under the
regulations, the import and export of the controlled chemicals must be handled
by the designated departments. No other department or individual is permitted to
engage in import and export of these items. In 1998, the Chinese government
added 10 controlled chemicals to the Controlled Chemicals List. The Amendments
to the Criminal Law of the PRC adopted in December 2001 designate as criminal
offenses such acts as illegally manufacturing, trafficking, transporting,
stockpiling or using toxic materials, and stipulate corresponding punishments
for such offenses.
In October 2002, the Chinese government further promulgated the Measures on
the Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies,
and the control list. The measures area substantive supplement to the
Regulations on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals, not only adding
10 chemicals to the list, but also providing for the export control of the
related equipment and technologies. The measures provide a licensing system for
the export of the materials and technologies on the control list. They require
importers to guarantee that the controlled chemicals and related equipment and
technologies supplied by China shall not be used for stockpiling, processing,
producing or handling chemical weapons, or for producing precursorchemicals for
chemical weapons, and that, without the prior consent of the Chinese government,
the related materials and technologies shall not be used for purposes other than
the declared end-use or be retransferred to a third party other than the
declared end-user. The measures also provide a registration system for exporters
and corresponding rules for the examination and approval of such exports, as
well as punishments for violations of the regulations.
In the missile field, China has always taken a prudent and responsible
attitude toward the export of missiles and related technologies. The Chinese
government declared in 1992 that it would act in line with the guidelines and
parameters of the MTCR in its export of missiles and related technologies. In
1994, it committed itself not to export ground-to-ground missiles featuringthe
primary parameters of the MTCR - i.e. inherently capable of reaching a range of
at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500kg. In 2000, China further
declared that it had no intention to assist any country in any way in the
development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons,
and that it would formulate and publish regulations on the missile export
control and the relevant control list.
In August 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations of the PRC
on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies, and
the control list. The regulations and the list, in light of the actual
conditions in China and the prevailing international practice, adopt a
licensingsystem for the export of missiles, items and technologies directlyused
for missiles, and missile-related dual-use items and technologies. The
regulations provide that the receiving party of the export shall guarantee not
to use missile-related items and technologies supplied by China for purposes
other than the declared end-use, or retransfer them to a third party other than
the declared end-user without the consent of the Chinese government. They also
provide for strict procedures for the examination and approval of such exports,
and the punishments for violations of the regulations.
In the arms export field, in addition to the above-mentioned special
regulations, the Chinese government promulgated the Regulations of the PRC on
the Administration of Arms Export in 1997, and revised them in 2002 in order to
strengthen the administration of arms export and to regulate arms export. The
regulations reaffirm the three principles that China has always adhered to in
its arms exports: being conducive to the capability for just self-defense of the
recipient country, no injury to the peace, security and stability of the region
concerned and the world as a whole, and no interference in the internal affairs
of the recipient country. The regulations also stipulate that arms export can
only be handled by arms trading companies which have obtained the business
operations right for arms export; that arms export shall be subjected to a
licensing system; and that dual-useproducts whose end-use is for a military
purpose shall be regardedas military products and be placed under control. In
November 2002,the Chinese government issued the Military Products Export
ControlList as a supplement to the Regulations on the Administration of Arms
Export, exercising, for the first time, arms export control according to the
list. The list contains a detailed classificationof conventional weapons and
armaments, constituting a framework with the main body of four levels of weapon
components, weapon categories, main systems or components of weapons, and the
parts and components, technologies and services directly related to the weapon
equipment, thus providing a scientific and powerful legal guarantee for
strengthening the control of the arms trade and armsexport.
In addition, the Regulations on the Import and Export Control of Technologies
issued by the Chinese government in 2001 also stipulate that strict control
shall be exercised over the export of nuclear technologies, technologies related
to dual-use nuclear products, the production technologies of controlled
chemicals, andmilitary technologies. The Customs Law of the PRC and the
Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC also provide a legal basis for
non-proliferation export control.
V. Strictly Implementing the Laws and Regulations
on Non-Proliferation Export Control
Through the past years, China has steadily improved and developed its laws
and regulations on non-proliferation, providinga solid legal basis and strong
guarantee for the better attainmentof the government's non-proliferation goals
and, at the same time,setting a new demand for law-enforcement capability of the
relevant functional departments of the government. In order to ensure the
effective implementation of these laws and regulations concerning
non-proliferation export control, the departments concerned of the Chinese
government have devoted a great deal of effort to improving non-proliferation
export control organs, publicizing the relevant policies and regulations,
conducting education for enterprises, and investigating and handling cases
ofviolations.
Export Control Organs: China's non-proliferation export controlinvolves many
of the government's functional departments. So far, a mechanism for a clear
division of responsibility and coordination has been established among these
departments.
China's nuclear export comes under the control of the Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), jointly with other
relevant government departments. Arms export, including the export of missiles,
and facilities and key equipment used directly for the production of missiles,
is under the control of COSTIND and the relevant department under the Ministry
of National Defense, jointly with other government departments concerned.
The export of nuclear dual-use items, dual-use biological agents, certain
chemicals, and the missile-related dual-use items and technology for civilian
use is under the control of the Ministry of Commerce (MC), jointly with other
government departments concerned. Among them, the export of nuclear dual-use
items and missile-related dual-use items and technologies is subject to
examination by the MC, jointly with COSTIND. The exportof dual-use biological
agents and technologies related to animals and plants is subject to examination
by the MC, jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture if needed. The export of
dual-use biological agents and technologies related to humans is subject
toexamination by the MC, jointly with the Ministry of Health if needed. The
export of equipment and technologies related to dual-use biological agents and
of equipment and technologies related tocertain chemicals is subject to
examination by the MC, jointly with the State Development and Reform Commission
if needed. The export of controlled chemicals is subject to examination by the
State Development and Reform Commission, jointly with the MC.
The export of sensitive items and related equipment and technologies that
relate to foreign policy is subject to examination by the above-mentioned
competent departments, jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Where the
export items entail significant impact on national security and public
interests, the competent departments shall, jointly with other relevant
departments, submit the case to the State Council and theCentral Military
Commission for approval.
The General Administration of Customs of the PRC shall be responsible for the
supervision and control of the import and export of the above-mentioned items
and technologies.
Special organs, staffed with specialists, have been set up in the
above-mentioned ministries and commissions to take charge of the export control
work.
Publicity of Laws and Regulations and Education for Enterprises:Immediately
after the non-proliferation export control regulationswere issued, a news
release was announced through the national media, and the full text of the
regulations and control lists was published in the professional publications and
on the web sites ofthe government departments, foreign trade enterprises and
researchinstitutes concerned. The publicity has provided favorable conditions in
informing the concerned exporters of the regulationsand control lists. Competent
departments concerned have also takenpositive steps to ensure earnest
implementation of the regulationsby relevant enterprises and institutions, and
to make export enterprises familiarized with the contents of the regulations and
procedures for export examination and approval by organizing lectures and
training courses on these regulations.
Building of the Export Examination System: In order to effectively implement
the export control regulations, China has established a system involving
application, examination and approval, certificate issuance and Customs control,
inspection andclearance, and this system applies to all interested exporters.
The Ministry of Commerce and other competent departments are formulating the
Export Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and Technologies (i.e. the
commodities on the lists attached to relevant export control regulations bearing
Customs HS codes), andare doing their best to ensure compliance by export
enterprises atall stages of export, and enhance the government's capability to
exercise supervision on export control.
To make it more convenient for export enterprises to apply for export
licenses, the Ministry of Commerce plans to provide an online service for
license application, examination and approval geared to the needs of the general
public once the operation system is available. The Chinese government will also
establish a corresponding export control information exchange network among the
examining, approving and license-issuing organs and the Customs office.
Investigation and Handling of Law Violations: The Chinese government attaches
great importance to the investigation and handling of cases of law violations
relating to non-proliferation.After being informed of possible illegal exports,
concerned competent departments will make earnest investigations and administer
corresponding administrative punishments, or transfer the cases to the judicial
organs for ascertaining criminal responsibility, depending on the seriousness of
the law-breaking acts. In recent years, China has dealt with a number of
law-breaking export cases and administered corresponding punishments to the
units and individuals involved according to law.
Strengthening the ability of law enforcement and effectively implementing the
non-proliferation export control regulations is acomplex system engineering
project that involves many aspects and requires coordination and cooperation
among different government departments. At the same time, understanding of the
relevant statepolicies and regulations by domestic enterprises, their increased
consciousness of the importance of non-proliferation, and the establishment of a
self-discipline mechanism among them also have a direct bearing on the
implementation of the non-proliferation laws and regulations. The concerned
departments of the Chinese government are summing up their experience,
constantly strengthening the training of the law-enforcing personnel,
intensifying publicity and further improving the domestic non-proliferation
export control system.
Conclusion
While sparing no effort to implement the non-proliferation policy, to
strengthen and to improve the non-proliferation laws and regulations and the
export control mechanism, the Chinese government is fully aware that the above
efforts should proceed ina systematic way and advance step by step.
The international non-proliferation effort is inseparable from the policies
and measures of the countries involved, and the building of the domestic
mechanisms in various countries is inseparable from the establishment of
international non-proliferation standards. China will continue to take an active
part in international non-proliferation endeavors, and exert greatefforts to
maintain and strengthen the existing non-proliferation international legal
system within the UN framework. It will constantly increase consultations and
exchanges with the multinational non-proliferation mechanisms, including the
"NuclearSuppliers' Group," the MTCR, the "Australia Group" and the "Wassenaar
Arrangement," and continue to take an active part in international discussions
related to non-proliferation.
The Chinese government will continue to keep in touch and hold consultations
with other countries on non-proliferation issues, and is willing to strengthen
its exchange and cooperation with allsides in the fields related to
non-proliferation export control tokeep improving their respective
non-proliferation export control systems.
Confronted with the complicated and changeable international security
situation, China stands for fostering of a new security concept of seeking
security through cooperation, dialogue, mutual trust and development.
Non-proliferation is an important link in maintaining international and regional
peace and security in the new century. China will join the members of the
international community who love peace and stability in making contributions to
accelerating the development and improvement of the international
non-proliferation mechanism and to promoting world peace, stability and
development through unremitting international efforts and cooperation and by
persisting in the settlement of theissue of proliferation of WMD and their means
of delivery through peaceful means.
